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discretion by individual courts to secure a politic result in each case.38 Very
probably the changed attitude of the Court which gave rise to the Alaska
Packers decision resulted in part from a similar distrust of inadequate choice of
law principles and from a dislike of the results of the Court's previous de-
cisions.39 Therefore, the Court would do well to progress slowly and to consider
carefully the policies to be served by any choice of law rules they may impose.
From that point of view the wisdom of the rule of the instant case and its
precedents is open to serious question, for conceivably a rule could be laid down
to serve a more desirable policy without sacrificing uniformity and certainty.
It is true that in European countries, unless the parties have provided other-
wise, insurance problems are decided under the law of the country in which the
company has its main office, in order to simplify business operations and risk
calculations.46 But experience in this country with the results of unequal bar-
gaining power between insurer and insured has led the legislators of many
states to believe that a maximum protection of the insured is essential. Seem-
ingly, the policy of those states is one which should be fostered, and problems
of the construction and effect of insurance contracts should therefore be uni-
formly decided under the law of the state in which the insured resided when the
policy was issued.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF NAZI ACTS OF STATE
The plaintiff, a former German national of the Jewish faith, was the owner
of the shares of stock in a shipping corporation. In January 1937, he was im-
prisoned in Hamburg, Germany, on charges of unlawful disposition of foreign
currencies. Because he was led to believe by "Nazi officials" that, unless he
gave up his shipping interests, his life and remaining property would be im-
periled, he transferred his shares to one Marius Boeger, a "Nazi designee."
Subsequently, Boeger, acting for the shipping line, sold a ship to the defendant,
a Belgian corporation, under conditions allegedly sufficient to put the defendant
on notice of the circumstances of the coerced transfer. The ship was sunk during
the war, and insurance proceeds were collected for the defendant by the Belgian
corporation, which owned a claim against a debtor in New York. The plaintiff
levied an attachment on this debt owed the defendant as a preliminary to an
action for conversion and loss of use of the vessel. The proceeding, begun in the
38 See Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor
Lorenzen's Essays, 56 Yale L.J. "55 (1947); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Con-
flict of Laws, 37 Yale LJ. 468 (1928).
39 Decisions depending upon the concept of substantive due process can probably be con-
sidered overruled at the present time. In that connection it is interesting to note that in the in-
stant case the Court expressly refused to rely on the place of making of the contract as de-
terminative, thus avoiding any question of due process.
40 Wolff, Private International Law 442 (1945); cf. Von Bar, The Theory and Practice
of Private International Law 66r (1892).
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Supreme Court of New York, was removed to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the second Circuit affirmed the District Court's order quashing the writ of
attachment and dismissing the complaint. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres
Societe Anonyme.'
The Circuit Court of Appeals, reasoning that the plaintiff's claim depended
upon the validity of a transfer brought about by officials of a foreign govern-
ment, declared that the validity of the transfer could therefore not be inquired
into by American courts, and that the general rule forbidding such inquiry had
not been changed with respect to Nazi Germany by the policy of our executive
branch of government. This decision appears to be based on the "act of state"
doctrine, according to which courts of one nation "will not sit in judgment on'
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.' It is sub-
mitted that the act upon which the plaintiff's claim depended was an "act of
state" within the meaning of that doctrine, but that there are sufficient indica-
tions of an executive policy of retroactive repudiation of the recognition of
expropriatory acts of the Nazi government to have warranted remand of the
case to the district court with instructions to write the State Department for a
statement of that policy as it pertains to this case.3
The act of securing the original transfer seems to have been an act of the
German government, done within its own territory, and precedent seems to
place it within the "act of state" doctrine even though the act might have been
illegal according to then existing German laws, was repugnant to our own laws
and policies and was performed by a government subsequently defeated in war
by our own.
To recover in this action the plaintiff had to show that Boeger was unable to
pass good title to the chattel, and to do this the plaintiff had further to demon-
strate that his transfer of the shares to Boeger was not legally effective. Accord-
ing to the German Civil Code, in whose territory of application the transfer was
made, and whose provisions are therefore applicable,4 a transfer is voidable if
it is induced by "illegal" coercion.5 If the coerced person avoids the transfer,
the avoidance is effective as to third parties who knew or should have known
of the illegal coercion.6 Thus the plaintiff, in order to recover, would have had
to demonstrate the illegality of the coercion. Instead, however, he alleged in his
complaint that the coercion was an act of "Nazi officials,"7 leaving open the
x 163 F. 2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), cerf. den. 68 S. Ct. 88 (i947).
2Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
3 Judge Clark suggested this in his dissent. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres Soci~t6
Anonyme, x63 F. 2d 246, 253 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
4 Rest., Conflict of Laws § 352 (1934).
s German Civil Code of 1896 §§ 123, 124. 6 Ibid., at § 142.
7 Transcript of Record, p. ig. The plaintiff further stated in-an affidavit in support of the
writ of attachment that he was arrested by the Gestapo. Transcript of Record, p. 12. In his
RECENT CASES
question whether of the Party or of the Government. Even in the former case,
their act would be an "act of state" because, in National Socialist Germany,
Party and state were regarded as constituting one unit,8 politically dominated
by the Party.9 "Acts of party officials against citizens" are reported to have
been held "valid law by the courts,"' and if "within the scope of their political
authority" not to have been subject to judicial review. x
While the "Nazi officials" may have acted in part from a desire for private
enrichment,"' the act nevertheless remains within the scope of the "act of
state" doctrine. A dictum in the Underhill case indicates that if the official is
"actuated by malice or any personal or private motive," the act will be con-
sidered a private act, 3 but this does not seem to apply where the official is
motivated by both the policy of the state and personal motives.14 Moreover,
even if the pleadings are not considered conclusive, it would seem that the
duress is to be regarded as a governmental act because the German government
subsequently ratified it."5
complaint he stated that he was coerced by the same officials who arrested him. Transcript of
Record, p. i9. Since the Gestapo was an official police agency it would seem that this allegation
alone was sufficient to justify the court in finding that the coercion was a governmental act; see
United States v. Watkins, 159 F. 2d 65o, 652 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
8 Law to Insure the Unity of Party and State of i December 1933, RGBL, 19331 ioi6.
9 Fraenkel, The Dual State 3 (1941). ° 0Ebenstein, The Nazi State 6o (i943).
"Fraenkel, The Dual State 35 (i94i). This governmental position of the Party and its
officials has been pointed out by Dr. Goldschmidt: "Considering the interpretation of the
position of the Nazi Party by the political leaders of Germany, by its Supreme Court, and by
its jurists, all of whom agree that the Party is called upon to execute the political will of the
people .... there can be no doubt that the Party, its officers and officials, its organizations are
agents or members of the Third Reich." Goldschmidt, Legal Claims against Germany 142
(i945); see also Ebenstein, The Nazi State 102 (i943); Heiden, The New Inquisition 4o-41
(1939); Institute of Jewish Affairs, Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews 16-17 (1943).
12 Goering, in November 1938, in discussing the advisability of issuing a decree compelling
"aryanization" of Jewish businesses is alleged to have stated:
"It is easily understood that strong attempts will be made to get all these stores to party-
members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible things in
the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they
now have about half a million." Stenographic Report of the Meeting on the "Jewish Question,"
trans. in 4 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression 427 (1946). For examples of such enrichment see
ibid., at 302-305.
'3 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
14 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), certain of General Villa's con-
fiscatory acts were found to be acts of the Mexican revolutionary government, but it seems
likely that Villa was not motivated solely by policies of that government. See 23 Encyclopaedia
Britannica i5o (14th ed., 1929).
S It appears from the periodicals of the time that the coerced transfer resulted in German
control of the lines. N.Y. Times, p. 4, col. 3 (Jan. 4, 1938); Cheapest Tourist Vessels Make and
Break Owner, ii Newsweek, No. 3, at 22 (Jan. 17, 1938); Egotistical Bernstein, Time, No. 3,
at 25 (Jan. 17, 1938). By retaining such control, it would seem that the German government
made the coercion a governmental act. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 359 (19o9).
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It has been squarely held that the fact that the act of the foreign government
is illegal under its own laws is not sufficient to remove the act from the "act of
state" doctrine."6 "So long as the act is the act of the foreign sovereign, it
matters not how grossly the sovereign has transgressed its own laws."'7
Moreover, courts have applied the doctrine to acts repugnant to our own
laws and policy. In United States v. Pink" the United States Supreme Court, in
overruling the New York Court of Appeals, which had refused to give effect to
Soviet confiscatory decrees because they were against the policy of the state,
held that state policies must give way to the foreign policy of the United
States.19 The same result has been reached by New York courts in several cases
dealing with anti-semitic acts of the Nazi government.20 In McCarthy v. Reichs-
bank"" the defendants allegedly coerced a Jewish person in Germany into trans-
ferring to them shares of stock. The court, in refusing to inquire into the valid-
ity of the transfer, stated that "it is legally immaterial that such acts are un-
just morally."'22 In Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft23 the defendant
had discharged the plaintiff in Germany in compliance with a Nazi law requir-
ing the elimination of Jews from business enterprises, and the plaintiff sought
to recover on his employment contract. The court stated that it was not com-
petent to review the acts of the German government, "however objectionable."'' 4
In 1943, in a case before a New York court, the plaintiff sought to recover on an
insurance policy taken out in Germany with the defendant, a Swiss company
doing business in Germany.2s The German government had confiscated the
plaintiff's funds in the Swiss company because the plaintiff was a Jew, and the
plaintiff attached the defendant's property in New York. The court in quashing
the writ of attachment stated, "As for the very obnoxious and offensive char-
acter of the German decrees, the court is obliged to hold that governing law is
6 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (19o9); Banco de Espafia
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2d 438, 444 (C.C.A. 2d, i94o); cf. Union Shipping and
Trading Company v. United States, 127 F. 2d 771, 774 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942). Plaintiff's trans-
fer occurred in January 1938. N.Y. Times, p. 5, col. 4 (Jan. 4, 1938). A decree permitting
certain German officials to direct Jews to sell or liquidate property interests was not issued
until December 3, 1938. Order concerning the Utilization of Jewish Property of 3 December
1938, RGBL 19381 1709.
'7 Banco de Espafia v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2d 438, 444 (C.C.A. 2d, 294o).
" 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
'X Ibid., at 232.
20 It would appear that the federal courts need not follow New York cases because the "act
of state" doctrine operates as a bar to the action and thus the proceeding would seem to be
governed by the law of the forum. Rest., Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934). However, there seems
to be no good reason why the federal courts should not follow these cases.
21 259 App. Div. ioi6, 2o N.Y.S. 2d 450 (294o), aff'd 284 N.Y. 739, 31 N.E. 2d 5o8 (294o).
2Ibid., at 1017, 451.
23 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E. 2d 798 (1938). 24 Ibid., at 479, 800.
2S Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, x82 N.Y. Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S. 2d
882 (1943).
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no less controlling because it is a bad law ..... [W]e cannot undo or set at naught
what has been done by the German government with the assets of the parties
in Germany."'6
Although no previous case has been found involving acts of a recognized
foreign government subsequently defeated in war by the United States, it
would seem that the subsequent defeat is not sufficient to remove the case from
the "act of state" doctrine. It has been held that the acts of governments subse-
quently overthrown by governments other than the United States are within the
doctrine.27 The rationale for these decisions, according to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Banco de .Espaiia v. Federal Reserve Bank,'2
is that "Persons who dealt with the former .... government are entitled to
rely upon the finality and legality of that government's acts, at least so far as
concerns inquiry by the courts of this country."' 9
The fact that it was our own government which overthrew the Nazi regime
does not seem to be significant except insofar as it reflects executive policy.
Thus, it is not to be considered in connection with the "act of state" doctrine
itself but only in connection with the question of whether our executive has
acted to relieve the courts of the traditional restraint imposed by the "act of
state" doctrine.
The principal rationale of the doctrine seems to be that in the conduct of
foreign relations our executive should have a free hand.3o If the executive
decides, however, that it is consonant with this government's foreign policy for
the courts to take jurisdiction in certain cases, they should take such jurisdic-
tion.3" If, therefore, the executive has repudiated the expropriatory acts of the
6 Ibid., at 782, 887. But cf. Weiss v. Lustig, 185 N.Y. Misc. 910, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 547 (7945).
27 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Banco de Espafia v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2d 438 (C.C.A. 2d, i94o). But cf. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176 (1877).
28 114 F. 2d 438 (C.C.A. 2d, i94o).
29 Ibid., at 444. It might be argued that the defendant was not entitled to rely on American
judicial refusal to inquire into the validity of the transfer because previous to the sale of the
ship our Executive had indicated his disapproval of Nazi anti-semitic acts. 1938 The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 596-97 (i94i); 1939 Ibid., at 2-3, 165 (1941).
This does not seem conclusive, however.
30 The reasons given for applying the "act of state" doctrine vary somewhat with the cases,
but the principal reason seems to be that in the conduct of foreign relations our executive
should have a free hand. Some of the reasons given by the courts are: it would "imperil the
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations." Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (i918); "it is a contradiction in terms to say that within its
jurisdiction it is unlawful" for a foreign government to act. American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (i909); "persons who dealt with the .... government are entitled
to rely upon the finality and legality of that government's acts ..... " Banco de Espafia v.
Federal Reserve Bank, ii4 F. 2d 438, 444 (C.C.A. 2d, i94o); "the hands of the state depart-
ment would be tied. Unwillingly it would find itself involved in disputes it might think unwise."
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 376, 138 N.E. 24, 26 (1923),
appeal dismissed 266 U.S. 580 (1924).
31 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); cf. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35,
38 (945).
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Nazi government retroactively, the court should inquire into the present legal
effect of the coercive act in the principal case. While executive policy has not
consistently retroactively repudiated acts of expropriation, it would appear
that it has been sufficiently repudiatory to warrant a remand with instructions
to submit a request to the State Department for a statement of the executive
policy as it affects this case.
In the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, discriminatory acts
against the Jews prior to September 1939 were not criminal under then-existing
international law. The Tribunal has stated that anti-semitic acts prior to
September 1939 were not "crimes against humanity."'
32
Neither do anti-semitic acts committed prior to September 1939 appear to
constitute technical "war crimes." The Tribunal's charter defines "war crimes"
as "violations of the laws or customs of war,"' 3 but Nazi Germany was not at
war prior to September 1939. Finally, by inference from the Tribunal's treat-
ment of the Gestapo, it appears that anti-semitic acts prior to September 1939
were not "crimes against the peace." 34 It appears, therefore, that the coercive
act of the German government upon which the plaintiff's action depended was
not criminal under then-existing international law and, thus, has not been
repudiated by our government on this ground.
An examination of Control Council Law No. 2 reveals that the Nazi Party
has merely been "abolished and declared illegal,"35 which seems to indicate that
our executive recognizes the acts of the Party until the date of its abolition. In
any event, it is extremely doubtful whether Control Council Law No. 2 may
be deemed an executive directive to the American judiciary in litigation such as
the Bernstein case.
Similarly, it would seem that if our executive had retroactively repealed
the laws providing for the economic elimination of the Jews, our courts might
be justified in inquiring into the legality of any act which resulted in deprivation
of property without just compensation. But again, the language of Control
Council Law No. i indicates that these Nazi laws have merely been "re-
pealed."36
The language of Control Council laws is not conclusive, however, as is indi-
3 The Tribunal stated: "The murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who
were likely to be hostile to the government was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of
the Jews during the same period is established beyond reasonable doubt ..... The Tribunal
[however] .... cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against
humanity within the meaning of the Charter ......" i International Military Tribunal, Trial
of the Major War Criminals 254 (1947).
33Ibid., at ii.
34 The Tribunal recognized that probably all Gestapo officials committed anti-semitic acts
prior to September 1939, 1 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals
265 (1947), but did not convict the Gestapo of "crimes against the peace." Ibid., at 268.
35 1 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany ig (Oct. 29, 1945).
36 Ibid., at 6.
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cated by the effect given to the Control Council Law restoring to Jews living
abroad the German nationality which had been taken from them by the Nazi
Eleventh Subsidiary Decree. This law has been said not to repeal that decree
retroactively.
Furthermore, our executive's action in providing for the return of expro-
priated property may be taken to indicate a desire to handle the matter without
interference from the courts. Military Government Laws 5237 and 5938 have
provided means for the return of property under certain specified conditions. It
may well be that executive policy is to provide for cases like the plaintiff's
through organizations other than the American courts. It would seem that the
best way to determine this would be to request a statement from our State
Department.
A case can be made for the view that our government has retroactively
repudiated expropriatory acts of the German government on the basis of the
latest expression of policy by our government and certain Military Government
laws providing for the return of expropriated property. A directive issued in
July 1947, approved by the State, War, and Navy Departments, to the United
States Commander in Germany states our present policy:
It is the policy of your government that persons and organizations deprived of
their property as a result of National Socialist persecution should either have their
property returned or be compensated therefor and that persons who suffered personal
damages or injury through National Socialist persecution should receive indemnifica-
tion in German currency.3 9
Considering this policy in the light of Military Government Laws No. 52
and 59, one may discover an executive policy to restore expropriated prop-
erty whenever and wherever possible. Law No. 52 provided for the seizure
and control by the Military Government of all property which has been "the
subject of transfer under -duress, wrongful acts of confiscation, dispossession or
spoliation ..... -40 A considerable amount of property has been taken under
control by virtue of this authority, and since June 25, 1947, owners of property
located in Germany who live outside Germany have been permitted to apply
for the release of such property to a German nominee.4' This did not apply to
"duress properties," however, and in November 1947 Law No. 59 was an-
nounced by our State and Army Departments.Y This law permits release of
property taken by duress if the property can be found within the United States
zone. If the owner lives outside of Germany, he must appoint a German
37 U.S. Military Government Gazette, Germany, Issue A, p. 24 (June i, 1946).
3s N.Y. Times, p. 24, col. i (Nov. i1, 1947).
39 U.S. Military Government, 102 Weekly Information Bulletin 3 (July 21, 1947).
40 U.S. Military Government Gazette, Germany, Issue A, p. 27 (June i, 1946).
41 U.S. Military Government, 24 Finance Report of the Military Governor (Cumulative
Review) 61 (1947).
42 N.Y. Times, p. 24, col. I (Nov. Ii, 1947).
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nominee, and if a claim is disputed it will be adjudicated by a restitution cham-
ber, a branch of the German courts. It appears, therefore, that our government
has permitted recovery of identifiable property taken by duress if the property
can be found within the American zone. Our government may thus be regarded
as having retroactively repudiated those expropriatory acts of the German
government which resulted in the taking of property now to be found in the
American zone. But such acts which involved property now in that zone are
hardly more reprehensible than like acts involving property now located else-
where. Rather, the reason for restriction of this retroactive repudication to acts
involving property now found in the American zone would seem to be that this
is the only property over which the Military Governor has jurisdiction. Thus,
so far as executive policy is concerned, it is arguable that the executive has
retroactively repudiated all expropriatory acts which involved the taking of
property, but, necessarily, has restricted the enforcement of the particular law
embodying this policy to the area in which the administrator of the law has au-
thority. Our courts would seem justified, on this reasoning, in inquiring into the
legality of expropriatory acts whenever they have jurisdiction over the property.
To hold otherwise places the government in the somewhat ludicrous position of
forcing possessors of looted property now in the American zone to return it to
the rightful owner, but of permitting persons to keep such property where they
have managed to get it into the United States.
The plaintiff in the principal case, however, would have some difficulty in
using this argument because the property he claimed was not the chattel itself
but money representing the chattel. Military Government Law No. 59 does
not cover "claims arising from war damage and injury not connected with the
wrongful taking of identifiable property."43 It is not clear whether the insur-
ance proceeds are "identifiable property," but it is arguable from both Ameri-
can and German law that they can be so considered..
It is realized that a determination requiring ascertainment of and compli-
ance with executive policy must seem a poor solution to a victim of Naziism who
sees "his" property being enjoyed by another in this country. But the problem
of settling these claims is a very difficult one. The economic losses suffered at
the hands of the Nazis have been tremendous.45 But Germany's resources are
43 Ibid.
44 Rest., Restitution §§ 202, 203 (1937); German Civil Code of 1896 §§ 812, 8W8. Even if a
policy statement by the State Department permitted inquiry by the court, the plaintiff in
the principal case would probably be unable to recover in this action because he was claiming
in his own name, a chattel which he never owned personally. Green v. Victor Talking Machine
Co., 24 F. 2d 378 (C.C.A. 2d, 2928).
But it is possible that in the near future the British government may permit Bernstein to
regain the corporate shares taken by the "Nazi officials." Restitution of Property Seized by
the Axis, The Law Journal, No. 4268, at 65 (Nov. 14, 1947). Bernstein might then bring suit
in the name of the corporation.
45 For estimates of the number of Jews from whom property has been taken see Institute of
Jewish Affairs, Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews 3o3-i1 (I943). -
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so limited that it is unlikely that it will be able to pay in full for the damage
done.46 Our government has made some provision for the return of identifiable
property, but it may well be that with respect to other types of claims the only
equitable solution will be for those injured to share the resources available. This
does not mean in the principal case that if the insurance proceeds are not con-
sidered identifiable, the Belgian corporation will necessarily be able to keep
them. It might be required to turn them over to an Allied commission, but this
would seem to be a matter to be settled by the Allied governments.
Moreover, even with respect to identifiable property in the United States it
is arguable that to insure uniformity of treatment these claims, as well as all
others, should be handled by a single agency. 47 Intricate questions as to the
measure of damages and what constitutes duress will arise, and it might be that
a court acting within Germany could best handle these problems.
At any rate, it seems clear that the problems are so complex that they should
be left to the executive until such time as he permits the courts to take juris-
diction.
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS CHECK ON
CORPORATE ANTI-LABOR POLICIES
The fiduciary obligations of corporate directors may have been strikingly en-
larged as a consequence of a recent New York decision which upheld the suffi-
ciency of a stockholder complaint alleging that the Remington Rand Company
had suffered monetary losses because of the anti-labor policy pursued by its
board of directors during the period 1934-1937. The chief allegations were that
the directors had ordered the dismantling and removal of corporate plants and
the curtailment of production with a resulting loss to the corporation in excess
of a million dollars, that these acts were not within the scope of reasonable busi-
ness judgment but were designed solely to intimidate the corporation's employ-
ees, and that the directors permitted themselves to be dominated with respect
to the corporation's labor policies by one who, it was asserted, was actuated by
anti-labor bias and personal prejudices. The New York lower court dismissed
the complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that "stripped
of its conclusionary statements" it "shows only a reasonable exercise of business
judgment by the directors" and that "no facts are set forth which show that
appellants [defendants] had interests adverse to the corporation or that they
dealt with the corporation for their own benefit or that they were guilty of waste
or fraud."' The New York Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that if
46 Goldschnmidt, Legal Claims against Germany i6i (i945); Cole, Reparations and the
Future of German Industry 17 (1945).
47 Goldschmidt, Legal Claims against Germany 168 (i94S).
Abrams v. Allen, 271 App. Div. 326, 6S N.Y.S. 2d 421, 422 (W946).
